TIME: Almanac 1990/1990 Time Magazine Compact Almanac, The (1991)(Time).iso/time/040389/04038900.043

Text File | 1990-09-22 | 8KB | 139 lines

NATION, Page 16

A Choice of Arms

Does the U.S. really need a new nuclear missile?

By Bruce Van Voorst


    It could be the most momentous national-security decision that
George Bush ever makes. In early April the President must choose
a multibillion-dollar plan for modernizing the nation's land-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles. Though dozens of basing modes
and several new missiles have been considered, only two expensive
mobile missile systems are really in the running: the rail-carried,
multiwarhead MX and the truck-transported, single-warhead
Midgetman. Bush's wisest course might be to deploy neither one.

    The President's deliberations will be guided by the concept
that has been the basis of U.S. nuclear deterrence for more than
30 years: that enough American weapons must survive a Soviet
surprise attack to guarantee a devastating retaliatory strike.
Pursuing that strategy, the U.S. has built a formidable triad of
strategic nuclear forces: land-based ICBMs in silos, sea-based
missiles aboard submarines, and nuclear bombs carried by airplanes.
But over the years, the increased accuracy of Soviet ICBMs has
gradually threatened the land-based leg of the triad, which
consists of 450 Minuteman IIs, each carrying a single warhead; 500
Minuteman IIIs tipped with three warheads; and 50 more modern MX's,
each with ten warheads. The Administrations of Gerald Ford, Jimmy
Carter and Ronald Reagan considered 30 or so ideas for rendering
U.S. ICBMs less vulnerable to Soviet attack. But as a report
co-authored by former Defense Secretary Harold Brown noted, all the
proposals were rejected because they failed the basic criteria of
being "militarily effective, affordable and politically
acceptable."

    As Bush makes up his mind, skeptical strategic experts are
challenging the fundamental assumption: that land-based missiles
are as vulnerable as some other experts fear. There is considerable
doubt that the Soviets could actually attack U.S. ICBMs with
impunity. Studies by the Pentagon suggest that even if the Soviets
aimed two warheads at each U.S. silo, they could count on
destroying only 65% to 80% of the ICBMs. That would leave at least
400 land-based U.S. warheads -- each packing about 20 times the
destructive force of the Hiroshima bomb -- for a counterattack on
the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Soviets would always have to fear
that the U.S., alerted to a surprise attack, would simply launch
its entire force before enemy missiles arrived. Says conservative
strategist Fred Ikle: "The Soviets can never have a high confidence
of destroying these missiles in their silos."

    Although many respected observers argue the case, it makes
little sense to worry unduly about the vulnerability of the
land-based leg of the triad when it accounts for only 20% of the
12,000 warheads in America's strategic nuclear arsenal. Even in the
unlikely event that a first strike wiped out the entire American
land-based missile force, the U.S. could still obliterate the
Soviet Union with a fraction of the 5,300 warheads on its modern
missile submarines and the 4,700 on its bombers. Though the first
operational test last week of a Trident II missile resulted in a
spectacular pinwheeling explosion, that failure was at worst a
temporary setback for a weapon that will give the U.S. a sea-based
silo-killing capability for the first time. In fact, it is the
Soviet Union, not the U.S., that has a real problem with the
survivability of its nuclear forces, since as many as 55% of its
warheads are concentrated in vulnerable land-based silos. That
explains why Moscow has developed the rail-mobile SS-24, which
carries ten warheads, and the truck-carried SS-25 single-warhead
missile.

    Logic, unfortunately, does not always dictate strategic
decisions. Irrational as the fear of a Soviet surprise attack may
be, psychological and political reasons alone may push the U.S.
into proceeding with a new mobile missile. As one congressional
expert put it, "You can't debate survivability for a decade and
then not do anything." It is unlikely that the Senate would ratify
a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that allowed the Soviets mobile
missiles unless the U.S. first decided to acquire a comparable
system.

    The critical question thus becomes which of the missiles to
buy. The ten-warhead MX, which Reagan dubbed the Peacekeeper, is
a proven, highly accurate ICBM. In one option, the 50 MX's already
deployed in ICBM silos would be supplemented by another 50
"garrisoned" on special railroad cars stationed on military bases.
If a U.S.-Soviet confrontation loomed, the missiles would be moved
out on 180,000 miles of railway across the nation. The main
advantage of this scheme is its relatively low price tag: an
estimated $12 billion for 50 missiles carrying 500 warheads. A
somewhat cheaper option ($8 billion) would shift the existing
silo-based MX's to railroad flatcars.

    The single-warhead Midgetman (a misnomer for a missile weighing
37,000 lbs.) would sidestep the vulnerability problem by being
deployed on hardened, tractor-drawn launchers. In times of crisis,
the launchers could be dispersed over thousands of square miles on
and off military reservations. But while military planners consider
the Midgetman more survivable in a surprise attack than the MX, it
is much more expensive: $39 billion for 500 missiles carrying 500
warheads.

    The choice between the two missiles must take into account the
projected overall ceiling of 4,900 land- and sea-based
ballistic-missile warheads that has been set in the START
negotiations. With smaller numbers of warheads on both sides, there
is a strategic advantage in single-warhead missiles like Midgetman.
By dispersing its quota of warheads on a larger number of Midgetman
missiles instead of concentrating it on a smaller number of MX's,
the U.S. could greatly complicate a Soviet first strike.

    Such logic argues powerfully for the Midgetman if and when the
U.S. modernizes its ICBM force. But the odds are that the
Administration will propose building at least some of both new
missiles. Bush will argue that the MX is a tested weapon that can
be speedily deployed on railcars to deal with the problem of
vulnerability. But given strong Democratic support for the
Midgetman, he will have to accept that system as well.

    Congress is likely to go along with the compromise, though a
heated debate over numbers and timing will ensue. The controversy
will involve claims that deploying the new missiles so diminishes
the threat of a surprise Soviet attack that the Strategic Defense
Initiative is unnecessary. Some SDI supporters will argue for
delaying new missile deployment in the expectation of major
breakthroughs in Star Wars.

    In the rush to judgment, both the President and Congress are
missing an opportunity to trump Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's
arms-control ideas. Soviet multiwarhead SS-18s pose the principal
threat to American ICBMs. It might be easier to reduce the threat
by negotiating further cutbacks in Soviet missiles than by building
new U.S. weapons. Under START, SS-18s would be cut 50%. Still more
reductions could be sought in return for a U.S. agreement to
refrain from deploying more MX's. Efforts could also be made to
dissuade the Soviets from further deployment and upgrading of their
ten-warhead SS-24, possibly in exchange for a U.S. offer to hold
off on the Midgetman or cut back on silo MX's. While these ideas
are being explored, strategic decisions should be based on the same
maxim that is supposed to guide physicians: "First, do no harm."

    Opting for both Midgetman and rail MX would be the worst
possible resolution of an ICBM survivability problem that may not
exist. For the U.S., there may be more to gain through imaginative
negotiating than from forging ahead with new ICBMs.